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COVER STORIES
COMPETITION PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT
LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE:
An Overview of the
FTC/DOJ Hearings
and the FTC Report
BY iILLARY GREENE
N 2002, TIE FEDERAl.TRADE COMMISSION and
Department of Justice conducted hearings examining
the "implications of competition and patent law and
policy for innovation and other aspects of consumer wel-
fare."t The antitrust agencies sought to better under-
stand and contribute to society's calibration of the balance
between competition and patent law and policy. The hearings
were extensive; they took place over twenty-four days and
involved more than 3001 panelists atnd approximately 100
public comments. Tihe contrihutrs and organizers were also
able to draw upon a vast body of research and commentary
regarding the relevant issues. In October 2003, the FTC
released its report, To Promote hinovation: 7he Proper Balance
ofCompetition and Patent Law and Policy." This article briefly
surveys both the FTC Report and the underlying hearings.
The Report analyzes patent law and policy front a compe-
tition perspective, which it defines as treating "consumer wel-
fare over time as the goal of both competition and patent
policy and reflectling) the application ofeconomic analysis to
patent issues." (Ch. 4, at IW Consumer welfare takes into
account both static efficiency conlsideratinns, such as price
and quantity, and dynamic efficiency considcratiots, such as
the nature, speed, and diffusion of innovation. Fromt the
FTC's competition perspective, the patent system should
achieve four main policy objectives:
(1) provide efficiet incentives for innovation; (2) safeguard
the patent systemr's disclosute functions [receipt of patents
requires public disclosure of the underlying invention]; (3)
avoid unnecessary restraints on competition; and (4) mini-
mize the sum of error and process costs and the detrimental
effects of uncertainty, Id. ch. I, at 36-37,
The FTC ultimately concludes that, "although most of the
patetnt systent wotks well, sonic modifications ate needed to
maintain a proper balance ofcompetition and patent law and
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policy." (Exec. Summary, at 4)4
Largely tracking the organization of the Report and the
hearings upon which it is based, this article first explores the
fundamental relationship nmong patents, competition, and
innovation and, in so doing, explains the significance of
"patent quality" to competition. The article then discusses
how the Report analyzes the contours of that relationship as
a function ofthe basic stibstantive patentability doctrines and
various patet procedures and presumptions. Finally, the
FTC's specific recomnendations to the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), the courts, the Congress, as well as the FTCs
intentions for its own actions, are presented.
The Competitive SignIficance of Patent Quality
Central to the Report is its conclusion that "questionable
patents ae a significant competitive concern and cal harm
innovation.' (Exec. Summary, at 5) Patent quality issues can
be analyed along two dimensions. First, the law itself is taken
as a given, anti the qtestion is: to what extent is it being prop-
erly applied? Second, tile law is not taken as a given, and the
question is: to what extent does the law reflect the underlying
goals sought to be achieved? In abstract terms, therefore, a
poor quality parent is one the issuance of which reflects mis-
application of the law or flaws in the law itself. Stated more
concretely, poor quality patents are likely to be invalid either
in whole or in pall (specific claims may be overly broad);
(Exec. Summary, at 5)4 i, even ifsuch patents are nomninally
valid, they arguably ought not to be. (Exec. Summary, at 5)
Poor quality patents include those that fail a "but/for" test.5
Namely, the prospect ofpatent protection was unnecessary for
the invention to have emerged in the same general time frame
with the attendant disclosure and commercial development.
(ch. I, at 37) With such substandard parents, society may
incur the competitive costs without the concomitant benefits
to innovation. Economist David Teece aptly summed up the
role of the antitrust agencies within this cost-benefit analysis,
"Antitrust authorities have [a) policy role to play encoumaging
reform" when it cones to patent quality even if it is not "in
antitrttsi ri'forcenewn issue."
'l'le complexity of the relationship between patents and
innovation emerges even in tile simple example of stand-
alone innovation. Patents promote innovation hy enabling
the patentee to better appropriate rents from the invention.
And public disclosure of the invention, tile quid pro quo
of patent law, further stimulates innovation. But actual
achievement of the patenat system's goals may be undermined
through questionable patent quality. (ch. 2, at 4) "Such
uncertainty Iregarding patent quality] harms competition
and innovation by distorting business planning, increasing
costs and risks, and interfering with the raising of capital
and the negotiation of licenses. (ch. 5, at 20)1
Assessing the trade-ofrs that patents entail becomes even
tmre complicated when one considers sequential innovation.
Innovation is often continuous. A Follow-on innovation may
build on an initial patent a further follow-on innovation may
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build upon that prior change; and so on. With sequential
innovation, the implications of poor patent quality become
even more pronounced. Even ; pior quality patent "necessary"
to subsequent innovation can act as a blocking patent, and a
number of such patents can create or contribute to a patent
thicket.
A blocking patent exists when others cannot exploit their
own inventions without infringing. Such patents may con-
tribute to market power when substitutes are unavailable and
designing around the patent is technically infeasible or when
the patent is necessary to comply with a marketplace stan-
dard. A patentee may prolong market power by precluding
access to technology necessary for the next generation of
products to emerge. To the extent that the promise of patent
protection is necessary to stimulate invention, disclosure, or
investment, society accepts the costs attendant to blocking
patents as necessary to maximize long-term economic welfare.
If the promise of patetit protection is unnecessary for those
purposes, however, then the costs-which may include high-
er prices or retarded Ibllow-on innovatio|-may cause unjus-
tified consumer injury. (Exec. Summary, at 7)
At the hearings, various representatives from tile hintech-
nology industry (which uses "cellular and molecular process-
es to address Irolulems or make products") stated that R&D
within their industry is "particularly lengthy"' and commer-
cializationi is "particularly difficult." (ch. 3, at 15-16) One
representative staletl that firms facing potentially blocking
patents which their analysis shows "may be invalid, may be
susceptible to prior art attacks," often have no choice bit to
"walk away from that area and decide not to engage in devel-
opment in that technology."5
In the case of patent thickets, consider the situation where
a firm requires access to multiple, existing patent-protected
technologies. Several panelists discussed a number of poten-
tial harms that could flow from poor quality patents within
this context. For example, patent law professor John Drmhy
noted that if the patentability standards-such as requiring
that inventions be "nonobvious"-are set too low, a "profi-
sion of paltry patents" could result,' IHe further cautioned
that although each individual parent may not "impose Sig-
nificant output constraints ... collectively they're very expen-
sive to search and license .... [Tihey may be a mine field..
.generatlingi a great deal of litigation due to accidental
infringements." Id. This environment could undermine
innovation because firnis fear ieing sued after considerable
investment. Even if these firms could obtain licenses, there is
nothing to guarantee that multiple stacked licenses would not
render the undertaking infeasible. (ch. 2, at 28, 32-33)
Industry Variation. As even this cursory discussion of
blocking patents and patet thickets suggests, the role of
patents varies among industries. A substantial portion of the
hearings, six of twetty-foiur days, involved panelists drawn
heavily from the business and economics communities dis-
cussing the relationship among patents, competition, and
innovation within difrerent industry contexts (pharmaceuti-
cal, biotechnology, computer hardware/scmiconductor, and
software/Internet). The FTC found that the role of patents in
spurring or impeding innovation often varied among indus-
tries owing to diverse factors ranging from the attributes ofthe
innovation (e.g., discrete or cumulative), to industry charac-
teristics (e.g., barriers to entry or capital intensity), to other
factors (e.g., alternative appiopriability mechanisms). (ch. 3,
at 1) Despite all these potential differences, panelists general-
ly agreed that poor patent quality blunts incentivu. to inno-
vate. (ch. 3, at 2)
A Competitive Analysis of Patent Law Basics
Understanding the competitive consequences of poor quality
patents requires some understanding of substantive and pro-
cedural patent law."5 Those seeking patent protection file a
patent application with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Evaluation of that application is governed by a combination
of C(ngressional stauttes, federal court rulings, and PTO
rtiles. In general teris, substantive patent law addresses the
issues of when to grant and uphold a patent as valid and how
to determine the proper scope of a patent's claims. The pro-
cedures and presumptions of patent law concern those patent
system mechanisms used to examine, reexamine, and litigate
patent validity. A few examples drawn from the Report illus-
trate the FTC's competitive analysis of patent law basics.
Substance. The substantive standards for patentability are
statutory and focus on tbur main issues: what categories of
invention are potentially patentable; whether a particular
invention is sufficiently innovative to merit a patent; whether
the invention is usefuil; and whether the patentee has suffi-
ciently disclosed the nature of the invention," Based oit the
hearings record, the FTC found that the fundamental statu-
tory standards for patentability as currently written could le
construed in a manner that adequately addresses competition
concerns and do not require change. (ch. 4, at 4) However, tile
FTC also found a basis for the concerns many panelists
expressed regarding the interpretation and application nfthose
statutory standards. The Commission concludes that the I1TO
and tile courts catl utilize the flexibility inherent in the basic
pawnt standards to help address a number of concerns.
Important challenges exist in attempting to better calibrate
tie substantive patent criteria.t his can be seen by examining
the criteria governing the sufficiency of innovation and dis-
closure.
SUFFicIENT INNOVATION. 'lb be eligible for parent protec-
tion, an invention must be nonobvious. This requires both
that the invention claimed differs from the prior art and that
those differences would not be obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. Herbert Wamsley, Executive Director
of the Intellectual Property Owners Association, has described
the nonobviottsness requirement as "the heart of the patent
law."' I He further stated that a "reasonably high obviousness
test" is needed, Id. at 139. One patent law professor charac-
terized the effect of a low nonobviousness standard as recre-
ating the misallocation of resources that the patent system
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itself seeks to cure.'' Many panelists shared that position.
The FTC recognized that the ;nterpretation ofnonobvious-
ness can affect the respective incentives of initial and follow-
on inventors, the extent of patent proliferation problems,
and the extent of any patent-related market power. (ch. 4.
at 4-6)
DISCLOSURI DOCTRiINES. In exchange for the grant of a
patent, the applicant must disclose his or her invention. The
"enablement" and "written description" doctrines prescribe the
nature of that disclosure." The enablement doctrine requires
the inventor to disclose the claimed invention in a manner Nor-
ficient to permit one skilled in the art to make and use it with-
out undue experimentation. Written description requires the
inventor to describe the invention sufficiently so that it is
clear that the inventor has actually invented what the patent
claims. (ch. 4, at 22)
The disclosure doctrines determine the breadth of the
patent issued. The FTC diicussed many competitive impli-
cations of patent breadth. For example, "rilf breadth is
defined too broadly, such as if it is broader than that which
is truly enabled, products that should be free to compete
instead may be blocked, and unwarranted market power may
result. (ch. 4, at 21) If breadth is defined too narrowly, it may
unnecessarily subdivide patent rights and potentially con-
tribute to the growth of a patent thicker which could itself
impede innovation." Id.
Procedures and Presumptions. To ensure patent quali-
ty, the patent system needs procedures and presumptions
that, wheilter through PTO proceedings or other routes such
as lirigat ion, efficietntly protect against imp rovidently grant-
ing patents or issuing patents of improper breadth, and effi-
ciently filter out such patents that are granted. Assessments
of patent quality also inevitably require consideration of
process and transaction cost issues and PTO resources more
generally.
To put transaction cost and resource issues in perspective,
the FTC received substantial testimony regarding the PTO's
workload. Then-PTO Director James Rogan, addressing the
Hearings, characterized patent applications recently faced by
the PTO as an "unprecedented explosion," iS In general teirs,
patent applications have doubled over the hst twelve years. In
20(11, the PTO received 300,000 aiplications and issued
190,000 parents. A corps of 3000 examiners must deal with
these applications-a corps which, nmany from the hearings
claimed, has a difficult time retaining senior exatminers and is
often overworked. Though official statistics are not released,
many panelists estimated that tile examiners spend some-
where between eight to twenty-five hours per patent. (ch. 5,
at 4-5) The general impression communicated was that this
was insufFicient time to "read and understand the application,
search fbr prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with
the applicant, work out necessary revisions, and reach and
write up conclusions." Id. at 5. Many argued that patent
quality suffers as a result, and that increasing pendency peri-
ods are also a problem. Id.
The FTC found persuasive the argument that because most
patent applications are not economically significant, society
should focus its resources upon those parents of significance
rather than "invest[ing] additional resources examining
patents that will never be heard from again." (Exec, Summary,
at 7, quoting Professor Mark Lcmley) "
Examinations. A defining characteristic of patent exami-
nations is their ex parte nature. Only the examiner and appli-
cant are involved in the process, during which tile examiner
must evaluate whether the patent meets the substantive
paten tabiliry crileria. This is the context in which the critical
nonobviousness determination is made, A key element of an
examination occurs when the examiner compares the claimed
invention with the "prior art." The patent examiner must con-
duct his or her own prior art search without the benefit of
third-party input and with limited applicant assistance. (ch. 5,
at 7)17 The PTO's logistical burden assumes particular signif-
icance owing to the legal burden it also bears. The courts essen-
tially require that tihe invention claimed in an application is
"presumed to warrant a patent" unless the PTO proves other-
wise. (Exec. Summary, at 9) Throughout the hearings, many
argued that this conhination of procedures and presumptions
increases the likelihood of improvidenily granted patents.
Litigation. Litigation can focus attention on those patents
that are most likely to hold commercial significance and weed
out from this group poor quality parents. However, several fea-
tures militate against whether litigation can routinely accom-
plish this task. For example, representatives across all indus-
tries described the "costly nature of litigation to invalidate
parents, hoth in terms of dollars and resources diverted from
research and development." (ch. 3, at 2) They opined that
even when challenged with poor quality patents, many firms
will pay licensing fees rather than become embroiled in typi-
cally expensive and lengthy patent li iga tion. Id. Many pan-
elists recommended that a timely, less crstly mechanism to
review poor quality patents would enhance innovation. Id.
Several panelists also expressed concerns regarding antitrust
litigation. They discussed how firms in different industries
have developed licensing practices to extract value from
patents or, in some cases, to obviate some of the problems
patent thickets raise. I lowever, the), also raised concerns that
uncertainty regarding antittust enforcement may unnecessar-
ily hinder the use of certain methods to extract patent value.
(ch. 3, at 2-3)
Recommendations for Patent and Competition Law
and Policy
The llC's central conclusion is that, for the most part, the
patent system as statutorily prescribed strikes the proper bal-
ance with competition policy, and that patent fundamentals,
such as the statutory standards of patentability, are-when
properly interpreted-compatible with competition policy
(Exec. Summary, at 2) Moreover, the FTC recognizes and
supports many ongoing efforts on the part of the Congress,
the PTO, and the Federal Circuit that have increased that level
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u cornpatibility. Consistent with that general outlook, the
FTC directs a series often recommendations (grouped below
into five categories) to the Congress, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, and the 11TO. Through them, the FTC
seeks to improve patent quality and minimize anticompetitive
costs of the parent system.
Funding. The single point of unanimity among hearing
participants was that the PTO lacks sufficient resources to
fully address patent quality. The FTC agrees and, therefore,
recommends that the PTO receive additional funds so that it
can improve the quality of its determinations on patentabili-
ty, (ch, 6, at 18) Though not a panacea, certain ploblems
associated with patent quality are suscepi ible to improvement
through ensuring adequate funding.
Economic Learning. The FTC Report states that to find
the proper balance between patent and competition law,
ilpicy-orienred interpretations that reflect economic thinking
are essential. (Exec, Sumnary, at 17)The FTC's recommen-
dations regarding substantive and procedural patent law reflect
such economic thinking. In addition to specific proposals,
the FTC encourages the Federal Circuit and the PTO to
incorporate economic considerations more generally into their
decision making.
Substantive Criteria. Those recommendations address-
ing substantive patentability doctrines seek to better ensure
that the legal thresholds for granting patents are consistent
with promoting competition and innovation, At one ex-
treme, an overly lax nonobviousness standard can generate a
"profusion of minor patents" or, at the other extreme, it can
create significant market power based upon a "technically
trivial development," (ch, 4, at 5)
Many panelists attributed low quality patentis to the Fed-
eral Circuit's application of the "suggestion test." 19 Soneties
all of the elements ofa claimed invention do not exist in any
one prior art document but rather in several different docu-
ments. The question under the nonobviousiess test then
becomes to what extent anytin, would have "suggested" to
a person of ordinary skill in the art that these separate pieces
of prior art be combined. Panelists were in stibstantial agree-
met that the Federal Circuit essentially requires the lPTO to
provide "specific and definitive [prior] art references with
clear motivations on how to comitic those references .... ,"20
The Commission tecognives that lie Federal Circuit's
"suggestion test" was motivated in patt by the legitimate con-
cerns that the 1TO develop an evidentiary basis for its find-
ings and in part by the court's concern with simply taking an
inventor's disclosture "as a blueprint for piecing together prior
art to defeat patentability-the essence of hindsight." (ch. 4,
at 13) Nonetheless, the FTC also believes that "some of the
patents upheld as nonobvious under the [Federal Circuit's
prevailing] suggestiorn test may he obvious under statutory
standards." d. The FIC cautions that, "a standard that
requires suggestions fir motivations exceeding what inventors
actually need, or that rigidly insists upon concrete docu-
Inentation of facts that by their nature are not concretely
demonstrable, can impair competition." Id.
Procedures. FTC recommendations addressing patent
procedures seek to improve PTO access to information nec-
essary for accurate determinations, whether through increas-
ing applicant obligations or third party access. One recoin-
miendation is that Congress create a new :tdministrarive
procedure to allow post-granr review of and opposition to
patents in order to provide a meaningful opportunity to chal-
lenge the grant of a patent short of ftll-scale litigation.
(ch. 5, at 18-24) As former 1'1'(. Director Dickinson
explained, reexamination and opposition are means for "com-
petitors to interact" with the patent process "much more effi-
ciently and effectively" to "improve ... the quality of patents
that issue .... "I
Plost-grant review proceedings would be of particular inter-
est to those whose activity would otherwise be unnecessarily
chilled by poor quality patents. In this way, post-grant review
offers a market-based inquiry because such challenges are
more likely to focus upon patents of economic significance.
(ch. 5, at 19) Such a focus avoids the cost and inefficiency that
would likely characterize any effort to perfect all examinations.
Post-grant review offers an opportunity for timely resolution
of uncertainty regarding patent validity in the settings where
that would be valued most. The FTC indicates that the con-
tours of its specific proposal reflect the objectives of "offering
sufficient value without duplicating litigation and protecting
the patentee against harassment and undue delay." (ch. 5,
at 20-23)
Presumptions. Tihe Report also recommends that cer-
tain legal presumprions, such as for litigated challenges to
patent validity, better reflect the realities of PTO procedures
and resources. Although the Patent Act merely requires that
patents shall he prestmmed valid, the F'I'C observes that the
Federal Circuit has "interpreted this requirement to impose
a clear ind convincing evidence standard on those who chal-
l'nge validity," despite the fact that the PTO's underlying
determinations are based on the lower "preponderance of
the evidence" standard. (ch, 5, at 26-28) The FTC con-
cudes that the "[piresumptions and procedures that favor the
grant of a patent application, combined with the limited
resources available to the PTO, counsel against requiring
'clear and convincing evidence' to overturn that presunp-
tion." (Exec. Summary, at 10) The FTC states that if "mar-
ket-selected inquiries cannot be conducted otn a level playing
field, there is serious potential for judicially confirming
unnecessary, potentially competition-threatening rights to
exclude." (ch. 5, at 28) Accordingly, it recommends that
Congress enact legislation specifying that challenges to patent
validity be determined based on the same standard by which
patents are conferred-"preponderance of the evidence." Id.
FTC Activities
As the FTC's Report recounts, the consequences of patents for
competition law and policy are profound and ongoing. Nor
surprisingly, then, the FTC charts a course of future conduct
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including a multi-faceted effort to increase commnunication
between the antitrust agencies and parent institutions, (ch. 6,
at 21-24)
Filing Amicus Briefs. "The FTC will increase its com-
petition advocacy role through filing amicus briefs in appro-
priate circumstances." (ch. 6, at 21) The FTC has a long his-
tory of competition advocacy, and it believes it can serve the
public interest by presenting its perspectives in patent cases
that affect competition. d. at 21-22.
Requesting PTO Reexamination. "In appropriate cir-
cumstances, the FTC will ask the P'O Dircctor to reexamine
questionable patents that raise competitive concerns," (cA. 6,
at 22) Panelists suggested that individual firms license dubi-
ous patents because no single firm has the incentive to finance
the legal challenge. The FTC can, however, consider the cost
sutch patents pose to an entire industry and the public at large
and, therrfore, overcome such coordination problems. The
FTC has requested PTO reexamination in the past and will do
so on a selective basis going forward, Id,
Encouraging Development of New Avenues for Com-
munication. The FTC will encourage greater dialogue
and coordination between patent institutions and antitrust
agencies. (ch. 6, at 22) Former PTO Director Dickinson
described such communication as able to "head off problems
. . .and , , . always, always beneficial." ' Profissor Brian
Kahin stated that the key to such communicarion is that it he
"continual and not occasional."' The FTC's recommenda-
tions to formalize such communication include the estab-
lishment of a Liaison Panel between the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies and the 1rTe and the foundation of an Office
of Competition Advocacy within the PTO to advise Iyl'O
policymakers about the competitive impact of their policies.
(ch, 6, at 23)
Antitrust Activities. One motivation for undertaking the
hearings was the practical recognition that increasing numbers
of antitrust cases involve patents or parent-related conduct.
Further insights into the patent system's functioning general-
ly and its operation within different industry contexts provide
an important storehouse of background information for the
agencies when developing antitrust policy and evaluating
enforcement actions,
A second report from the hearings directly addressing
antitrust issues will be issued by the FTC and DOJ in 2004.
While it is premature to address the content of that report, the
critical foundation has been laid, Throughout the hearings, the
agencies received considerable testimony regarding different
tools used to navigate the patent landscape. Specifically, tes-
timony addressed practices including cross-licensing, patent
pools, standard setting, and reach-through licensing agree-
ments. In the second report, the antitrust agencies will explore
how antitrust policies regarding such practices can strike the
proper balance between patents and competition. 4
Conclusion
Throughout the hearings, the FTC and DOJ drew upon an
extraordinary reservoir of expert opinion and analysis on the
relationship between patents, competition, and innovation. As
the law and policy of patents and competition are inextrica-
bly linked, the FTCs Report offers a critical perspective in the
ongoing patent reform debate." The FTC concludes its
Report by stating its desire "to include all parties in discussion
and implementation( of [its] reconmendations." (ch. 6, at 24)
Ideally, not only the FTC's recommendations, but also the
concerns motivating them will become Ipart of the broader
social discussion regarding patent reform, and consutmer wel-
fare will be the better for it.E
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